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Abstract
This study examined whether ventral frontostriatal regions differentially code expected and
unexpected reward outcomes. We parametrically manipulated the probability of reward and
examined the neural response to reward and nonreward for each probability condition in the ventral
striatum and the orbitofrontal cortex (OFC). By late trials of the experiment, subjects showed slower
behavioral responses for the condition with the lowest probability of reward, relative to the condition
with the highest probability of reward. At the neural level, both the nucleus accumbens (NAcc) and
OFC showed greater activation to rewarded relative to nonrewarded trials, but the accumbens
appeared to be most sensitive to violations in expected reward outcomes. These data suggest distinct
roles for frontostriatal circuitry in reward prediction and in responding to violations in expectations.
Introduction
Forming accurate predictions and detecting violations in expectations about upcoming
rewarding events is an essential component of goal-directed behavior. Nonhuman primate and
human imaging studies suggest that dopamine-rich frontostriatal regions are involved in
forming predictions about future reward outcomes and optimizing behavior accordingly. The
neural mechanisms of reward-related prediction error - a representation of the discrepancy
between the actual and expected reward (Schultz et al, 1997) - have been studied in nonhuman
primates in terms of expected and unexpected rewards and/or omissions of reward (Hollerman
et al, 1998, Leon and Shadlen, 1999; Tremblay and Schultz, 1999). The current study used a
simple spatial delay match-to-sample task, similar to one used previously with nonhuman
primates (Fiorillo et al, 2003), which manipulated the probability of reward outcome, to
examine neural responses to expected and unexpected rewards.
Converging evidence implicates the dopamine system as being critical to prediction and reward
processing (Olds and Milner, 1954; Montague et al, 2004, Schultz, 2002 for review).
Nonhuman primate studies have shown that dopamine neurons respond to unexpected primary
rewards and eventually to the stimuli that predict those rewards (Mirencowicz & Schultz,
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1994, Tobler et al, 2005). Dopamine neurons in the ventral tegmental area (VTA) of the monkey
will fire in response to a primary reward that is unpredicted (or predicted with a low probability)
more than to a reward that is fully predicted (Fiorillo et al, 2003;Tobler et al, 2005). Conversely,
the activity of the same neurons is suppressed when an expected reward is not delivered relative
to an expected omission of reward (Fiorillo et al, 2003; Tobler et al, 2005). Thus, dopamine
neurons code for prediction error by representing the discrepancy between the actual and
predicted outcome (Schultz et al, 1997; Tobler et al, 2005), such that unexpected presentation
of reward results in increased activity and unexpected omissions of reward results in decreased
activity.
Changes in dopamine firing in response to changes in reward outcome is paralleled by
alterations in behavior. Nonhuman primate studies have found that a monkey will increase its
anticipatory licking as a function of the probability with which a conditioned stimulus is
associated with subsequent unconditioned stimulus (juice delivery). As such, stimuli
representing a high probability of subsequent juice delivery elicit more anticipatory licking
(Fiorillo et al., 2003).
Reciprocal anatomical connections exist between regions associated with goal-directed
behavior (e.g. prefrontal cortex) and those associated with more automatic appetitive behaviors
(e.g. ventral striatum) where predictions might be computed (Shultz et al., 1997; Haber et al.,
2003). These regions are heavily innervated with dopamine through projections from midbrain
dopamine neurons and these connections may form a functional neuroanatomical circuit that
supports optimization of behavior in favoring actions that result in the greatest gains.
Recently, human functional magnetic resonance imaging (fMRI) studies have implicated two
regions of this circuit, the nucleus accumbens and orbitofrontal cortex, in the representation of
prediction error. For instance, unpredictable sequences of juice and water delivery have been
shown to elicit increased activity in the NAcc relative to predictable delivery (Berns et al,
2001). Prediction error based on temporal (McClure et al, 2003) and stimulus (O’Doherty et
al, 2003 O’Doherty et al, 2004) violations also activate the ventral striatum.
The role of the OFC in reward prediction has been less clear. While some studies have reported
sensitivity of the OFC under conditions of prediction error (Berns et al., 2001; O’Doherty et
al., 2003; Ramnini et al., 2004; Dreher et al., 2005) others have not (McClure et al., 2003;
O’Doherty et al., 2004; Delgado et al., 2005). Studies with less emphasis on prediction error
show greater OFC activation to favorable relative to unfavorable outcomes (O’Doherty et al,
2001; Elliott et al, 2003; Galvan et al, 2005) in studies of reward value (Gottfried et al,
2003), and valence (Cox et al, 2005; O’Doherty, 2000 O’Doherty, 2003 O’Doherty, 2004).
Recently, Kringelbach and Rolls (2004) integrated the neuroimaging and neuropsychological
literature to account for varied functions of the orbitofrontal cortex. They suggest a medial-
lateral distinction and an anterior-posterior distinction. The medial and lateral orbitofrontal
cortex monitor reward value and evaluation of punishers, respectively (e.g. O’Doherty et al,
2001 ; Rolls et al, 2003). The anterior orbitofrontal cortex is thought to be involved more in
the representation of abstract reinforcers (O’Doherty et al, 2001) over simpler ones related to
taste (e.g. De Araujo et al, 2003) and pain (e.g. Craig et al, 2000).
These ventral frontostriatal regions have recently (Knutson et al, 2005) been associated with
the representation of expected value (the product of expected probability and magnitude of
outcome) during anticipation of reward outcome. Given the elegant, but complex, design that
included 18 cues representing numerous combinations of magnitude, probability and/or
valence, a lack of statistical power precluded the authors from examining brain activation
related to incentive outcomes. In the present study, we used three distinct cues, each of which
was associated with 33%, 66% or 100% reward for correct trials. The emphasis of this study
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was on reward outcome rather than reward anticipation, in order to examine sensitivity at the
neural level to violations in reward expectations, rather than to anticipation of reward prior to
the outcome. This analysis is critical in understanding predictability of rewards because of the
changes in dopamine firing that occur at reward outcome when violations of predicted
expectations occur (Fiorillo et al, 2003).The a priori predictions about the accumbens and the
OFC response to expected and unexpected monetary reward were based on prior imaging work
implicating these regions in reward processing (Knutson et al, 2001; 2005; O’Doherty et al,
2001; Galvan et al, 2005). We used a simple spatial delayed match to sample paradigm similar
to that used by Fiorillo et al (2003) in electrophysiological studies of dopamine neurons in
nonhuman primates. We hypothesized that activity in the ventral striatum, in particular the
NAcc, would increase when an unexpected reward was delivered and would decrease when
an expected reward was not delivered. Behavior was expected to parallel these changes with
faster mean reaction times to cues predicting reward most often, but slower reaction times to
the cue predicting reward least often. Furthermore, we hypothesized that the OFC would be
sensitive to reward outcome (reward or not), but that the accumbens would be most sensitive
to changes in reward predictions. These hypotheses were based on reports from previous
imaging studies (Galvan et al 2005, in press) and nonhuman primate work showing greater
striatal involvement in reward probability parameters, relative to the reward-locked activity of
the OFC (Schultz, et al, 2000) and on the fixed rather than varying amount of reward across
the probability conditions.
Methods
Participants
Twelve right-handed healthy adults (7 female), ages 19–27 (mean age 24 years), were included
in the fMRI experiment. Subjects had no history of neurological or psychiatric illness and all
subjects were consented to the Institutional Review Board approved study prior to
participation.
Experimental Task
Participants were tested using a modified version of a delayed response two-choice task
described previously (Galvan et al, 2005) in an event-related fMRI study (Figure 1). In this
task, three cues were each associated with a distinct probability (33%, 66% and 100%) of
obtaining a fixed amount of reward. Subjects were instructed to press either their index or
middle finger to indicate the side on which a cue appeared when prompted, and to respond as
quickly as possible without making mistakes. One of three pirate cartoon images was presented
in random order on either the left or right side of a centered fixation for 1000 msec (see Figure
1). After a 2000 msec delay, subjects were presented with a response prompt of two treasure
chests on both sides of the fixation (2000 msec) and instructed to press a button with their right
index finger if the pirate was on the left side of the fixation or their right middle finger if the
pirate was on the right side of the fixation. After another 2000 msec delay, either reward
feedback (cartoon coins) or an empty treasure chest was presented in the center of the screen
(1000 msec) based on the reward probability of that trial type. There was a 12 sec intertrial
interval (ITI) before the start of the next trial.
There were three reward probability conditions: a 33%, 66% and 100% reward probability. In
the 33% condition, subjects were rewarded on 33% of the trials and no reward (an empty
treasure chest) occurred on the other 66% of the trials in that condition. In the 66% condition,
subjects were rewarded on 66% of trials and no reward occurred for the other 33% of trials. In
the 100% condition, subjects were rewarded for all correct trials.
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Subjects were guaranteed $50 for participation in the study and were told they could earn up
to $25 more, depending on performance (as indexed by reaction time and accuracy) on the
task. Stimuli were presented with the integrated functional imaging system (IFIS) (PST,
Pittsburgh) using a LCD video display in the bore of the MR scanner and a fiber optic response
collection device.
The experiment consisted of five runs of 18 trials (6 each of the 33%, 66% and 100% probability
of reward trial types), which lasted 6 min and 8 s each. Each run had 6 trials of each reward
probability presented in random order. At the end of each run, subjects were updated on how
much money they had earned during that run. Prior to beginning the experiment, subjects
received detailed instructions that included familiarization with the stimuli employed and
performed a practice run to ensure task comprehension. They were told that a relationship
existed between the cues and monetary outcomes, but the exact nature of that relationship was
not revealed.
Image Acquisition
Imaging was performed using a 3T General Electric MRI scanner using a quadrature head coil.
Functional scans were acquired using a spiral in and out sequence (Glover & Thomason, 2004).
The parameters included a TR=2000, TE=30, 64 X 64 matrix, 29 5-mm coronal slices, 3.125
X 3.125-mm in-plane resolution, flip 90°) for 184 repetitions, including four discarded
acquisitions at the beginning of each run. Anatomical T1 weighted in-plane scans were
collected (TR=500, TE=min, 256 X 256, FOV=200 mm, 5-mm slice thickness) in the same
locations as the functional images in addition to a 3-D data set of high resolution SPGR images
(TR=25, TE=5, 1.5 mm slice thickness, 124 slices).
Image Analysis
The Brainvoyager QX (Brain Innovations, Maastricht, The Netherlands) software package was
used to perform a random effects analysis of the imaging data. Before analysis, the following
preprocessing procedures were performed on the raw images: 3D motion correction to detect
and correct for small head movements by spatial alignment of all volumes to the first volume
by rigid body transformation, slice scan time correction (using sinc interpolation), linear trend
removal, high-pass temporal filtering to remove non-linear drifts of 3 or fewer cycles per time
course, and spatial data smoothing using a Gaussian kernel with a 4mm FWHM. Estimated
rotation and translation movements never exceeded 2mm for subjects included in this analysis.
Functional data were co-registered to the anatomical volume by alignment of corresponding
points and manual adjustments to obtain optimal fit by visual inspection and were then
transformed into Talairach space. During Talairach transformation, functional voxels were
interpolated to a resolution of 1 mm3 for alignment purposes, but the statistical thresholds were
based on the original acquisition voxel size. The nucleus accumbens and orbital frontal cortex
were defined by a whole-brain voxelwise GLM with reward as the primary predictor (see
below) and then localized by Talairach coordinates in conjunction with reference to the
Duvernoy brain atlas (Talairach & Tournoux, 1988; Duvernoy, 1991).
Statistical analyses of the imaging data were conducted on the whole brain using a general
linear model (GLM) comprised of 60 (5 runs X 12 subjects) z-normalized functional runs. The
primary predictor was reward (reward versus nonreward trials) across all reward probabilities
at reward outcome. The predictor was obtained by convolution of an ideal boxcar response
(assuming a value 1 for the volume of task presentation and a volume of 0 for remaining time
points) with a linear model of the hemodynamic response (Boynton et al, 1996) and used to
build the design matrix of each time course in the experiment. Only correct trials were included
and separate predictors were created for error trials. Post hoc contrast analyses on the regions
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of interest were then performed based on t-tests on the beta weights of predictors. Monte Carlo
simulations were run using the AlphaSim program within AFNI (Cox, 1996) to determine
appropriate thresholds to achieve a corrected alpha level of p<0.05 based on search volumes
of approximately 25,400 mm3 and 450 mm3 for the orbital frontal cortex and nucleus
accumbens, respectively. Percent changes in the MR signal relative to baseline (interval
immediately preceding the 20 sec trial) in the nucleus accumbens and orbital frontal cortex
were calculated using event-related averaging over significantly active voxels obtained from
the contrast analyses.
The whole brain GLM was based on 50 reward trials per subject (n=12) for a total of 600 trials
and 30 nonreward trials per subject (n=12) for a total of 360 nonreward trials across the entire
experiment. Subsequent contrasts on the reward probability conditions consisted of different
numbers of reward and no reward trials. For the 100% reward probability condition there were
6 reward trials per run (5) per subject (12) for a total of 360 reward trials and no nonreward
trials. For the 66% reward probability condition there were 4 reward trials per run (5) per subject
(12) for a total of 240 reward trials and 120 nonreward trials. For the 33% reward probability
condition, there were 2 reward trials per run (5) per subject (12) for a total of 120 reward trials
and 240 nonreward trials.
Results
Behavioral Data
The effects of reward probability and time on task were tested with a 3 (33%, 66%, 100%) x
5 (runs 1–5) repeated measures analysis of variance (ANOVA) for the dependent variables of
mean reaction time (RT) and mean accuracy.
There were no main effects or interactions of probability of reward (F[2,22]=.12, p<.85) time
on task (F[4,44]=2.02, p<.14) or reward probability X time on task (F[8, 88]=1.02, p<.41) for
mean accuracy. This was to be expected as participants’ accuracy reached near ceiling levels
for all probabilities of the experiment (33% condition=97.2%; 66% condition=97.5%; 100%
condition=97.7%).
There was a significant interaction between probability of reward and time on task (F[8,88] =
3.5, p < .01) on mean RT, but no main effects of time on task (F[4,44] = .611, p < 0.59) or
probability of reward (F[2,22]= 2.84, p < 0.08). Post-hoc t tests of the significant interaction
showed that there was a significant difference between the 33% and 100% reward probability
conditions during late trials of the experiment (run 5) (t(11)=3.712, p<.003), with faster mean
RT for the 100% reward probability condition (mean =498.30, sd=206.23) relative to the 33%
condition (mean=583.74, sd=270.23).
The difference in mean reaction time between the 100% and 33% conditions increased two-
fold from early to late trials (see Figure 2a). To further show learning, we introduced a reversal,
switching the probabilities of reward for the 33% and 100% conditions at the end of the
experiment. A 2 (probability) X 2 (reversal and non-reversal) ANOVA for late trials showed
a significant interaction (F (1,11)=18.97, p=0.001), with a decrease in RT to the condition that
was the 33% probability in the non-reversal (mean=583.74, sd=270.24) and 100% in the
reversal (mean=519.89,sd=180.46) (Figure 2b).
Imaging Results
A GLM for correct trials using reward probability as the primary predictor was modeled at the
point in which the subject received feedback of reward or not (i.e. outcome). This analysis
identified the regions of the NAcc (x=9, y=6, z=−1 and x=−9, y=9, z=−1) and OFC (x=28,
y=39, z =−6) (see Figure 3a,b). Post-hoc t-tests between the beta weights of the rewarded versus
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nonrewarded trials showed greater activation in both of these regions to reward (NAcc: t(11)
=3.48, p<0.01; OFC x=28, y=39, z =−6, t(11)=3.30, p<0.02)1.
There were two possible outcomes (reward or no reward) for the two intermittent reward
schedules (33% and 66% probability) and only one outcome for the continuous reward schedule
(100% reward probability), which was used as a comparison condition. Whereas there was a
main effect of reward (reward versus no reward trials) in the OFC described above, OFC
activity did not vary as a function of reward probability in the current study [F(2,10)=0.84,
p=0.46). In contrast, the NAcc showed distinct changes in activity to outcome as a function of
the reward probability manipulation [F(2,10)=9.32, p<0.005]. Specifically, NAcc activity
increased to reward outcomes, when the reward was unexpected (33% reward probability
condition) relative to expected (100% baseline condition) [t(11)=2.54, p<.03 see Figure 4a].
Second, there was diminished NAcc activity to no reward, when a reward was expected and
not received (66% reward probability condition) relative to reward that was not expected or
received (33% reward probability condition; t(59)=2.08, p<.04; see Figure 4b). Note that there
were no significant differences in activation between the 33% and 66% reward probability
conditions [t(11)=.510, p=.62] or between the 66% and 100% rewarded probability conditions
[t(11)=1.20, p=.26] in rewarded outcomes. MR signal as a function of reward outcome and
probability are shown in Figure 4.
Discussion
This study examined the effects of violations in expected reward outcomes on behavior and
neural activity in the accumbens and orbital frontal cortex (OFC), shown previously to be
involved in anticipation of reward outcomes (McClure et al 2004; Knutson et al, 2005). We
showed that both the nucleus accumbens and OFC were recruited during rewarded trials
relative to nonrewarded trials, but only the nucleus accumbens showed sensitivity to violations
in predicted reward outcome in this study. Greater sensitivity of the accumbens to reward value
(e.g., magnitude) relative to the OFC has been shown in previous work (Galvan et al 2005),
and together these findings suggest this region may be involved in the computation of both
magnitude and probability of reward. The lack of sensitivity in the OFC to these manipulations
may reflect a more absolute representation of reward or ambiguity in outcome (Hsu et al.,
2005). Alternatively, as the MR signal was more variable in this region, these effects may have
been weakened in the current study.
In electrophysiological studies in animals, dopamine neurons in the midbrain (which project
to the nucleus accumbens) have been shown to have little to no response to predicted reward
outcomes (probability=1.0), but show phasic firing when reward is delivered with less than
100% probability, even after extensive training (Fiorillo et al, 2003). In the current study, we
showed greater accumbens activity to reward when the reward was unexpected (33% condition)
relative to when it was expected (100% condition) consistent with these findings. Further,
electrophysiological studies of dopamine neurons in animals (e.g., Fiorillo et al, 2003) have
shown that for trials on which reward was predicted, but did not occur, neuronal activity
decreased. The current study showed a similar pattern in the accumbens, with a decrease in
activity in this region in the non-rewarded trials for the 66% reward probability condition
relative to the 33% condition.2
1The NAcc [t(11)=3.2, p<0.04] and OFC [t(11)=3.5, p<0.02] showed increased activity in anticipation of reward for the intermittent but
not the continuous reward condition
2Omission of reward outcome in the 33% condition resulted in a slight increase in NAcc activity rather than a decreased one, similar to
that observed by Knutson et al., 2001. One possible interpretation of this result is that subjects were intrinsicially motivated or rewarded
if they predicted that no reward would come for that trial, and none did. Alternatively, since reward outcome for these trials were the
fewest in number across the experiment, the activity may reflect continued learning for this condition.
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Dopamine neurons have been implicated in learning in two ways. First, they encode
contingencies between stimuli (or response) and outcomes through prediction errors signals
that detect violations in expectations (Schultz et al, 1997; Mirencowicz and Schultz, 1998;
Fiorillo et al, 2003). Thus the prediction error seems to provide a teaching signal that
corresponds to the learning principles initially described by Rescorla and Wagner (1972).
Second, they serve to alter behavioral responses (Schultz et al, 1997; McClure et al, 2004) such
that actions are biased toward the cues that are most predictive. In the current study we show
that by late trials of the experiment, the most optimal performance is for the condition with the
highest probability of reward (100% reward probability) and least optimal for the lowest
probability condition (33% reward probability). This behavioral finding is consistent with
previous probability work showing least optimal performance with the lowest probability of
reward outcome, suggesting that reward contingencies were learned over time (Delgado et al,
2005). To further show learning, we introduced a reversal, switching the probabilities of reward
for the 33% and 100% conditions at the end of the experiment. This manipulation resulted in
attenuation of differences between these conditions further corroborating learning effects.
A major goal of reward-related studies is to determine how rewards influence and bias behavior
(e.g. Robbins and Everitt, 1996; Schultz, 2004) in addition to characterizing the underlying
neural processing. Numerous factors contribute to how quickly and robustly rewards influence
behavior, including schedules of reinforcement (Skinner, 1958), reward value (Galvan et al,
2005), and reward predictability (Fiorillo et al, 2003; Delgado et al, 2005). Expected value,
which is the product of the magnitude and probability of a reward (Pascal, ca 1600s), influences
behavioral choices (von Frisch, 1967; Montague et al, 1995; Montague and Berns, 2002). Using
a very similar task in which only the outcome (magnitude instead of probability) differed from
the current study, we showed that the nucleus accumbens was sensitive to discrete reward
values (Galvan et al, 2005). Taken together with the evidence presented here and elsewhere
(Tobler et al, 2005), we suggest that the ventral striatum likely contributes to the computation
of expected reward value given its sensitivity to both reward probability and magnitude.
The role of the orbital frontal cortex in reward prediction is consistent with functional
subdivisions of this region by Kringelbach and Rolls (2004). They suggest that more anterior
and medial portions of OFC are sensitive to abstract reward manipulations. The OFC activation
in this study was observed in this general location. Electrophysiological studies implicate the
OFC in coding subjective value of a reward stimulus (for review, O’Doherty, 2004). For
instance, OFC neurons fire to a particular taste when an animal is hungry, but decrease their
firing rate once the animal is satiated and the reward value of the food has diminished (Critchley
and Rolls, 1996). As such, others have suggested the OFC is most sensitive to relative rewards
(Tremblay and Schultz, 1999) and reward preference (Schultz et al, 2000). Neuroimaging
studies have shown an analogous pattern in humans with a variety of stimuli, including taste
(O’Doherty et al, 2001; Kringelbach et al, 2003), olfaction (Anderson et al, 2003; Rolls et al,
2003), and money (Elliott et al, 2003; Galvan et al, 2005), with each activation varying in the
location of activity from anterior to posterior and from medial to lateral OFC. The OFC has
been implicated in anticipation of reward (O’Doherty et al 2002), but only insofar as the
predictive value of the response is linked to the specific value of the associated reward, rather
than in the probability of that reward occurring (O’Doherty, 2004 ). In the current study, we
did not see sensitivity to violations in reward prediction in the OFC. Knutson and colleagues
(2005) have reported correlations between probability estimates and brain activation in
anticipation of reward in the mesial prefrontal cortex (Knutson et al 2005), but not specifically
in the orbital frontal cortex. In contrast, Ramnani et al (2004 ) reported OFC sensitivity to
positive prediction error in medial orbital frontal cortex using a passive viewing task and Dreher
et al. (2005) reported OFC error prediction in a task that manipulated both the probability and
magnitude of predictive cues, but these contingencies were learned prior to scanning. It is
therefore still tenable that OFC can compute predicted rewards, but perhaps these calculations
Spicer et al. Page 7
Neuroimage. Author manuscript; available in PMC 2008 January 1.
N
IH
-PA Author M
anuscript
N
IH
-PA Author M
anuscript
N
IH
-PA Author M
anuscript
are cruder (i.e. summed over a range of probabilities) or slower to form relative to the precise
calculations that appear to occur in the NAcc. Alternatively, this region may be more sensitive
at detecting stimuli of uncertain and/or ambiguous value, as proposed by Hsu et al (2005), than
at detecting violations in reward prediction. Hsu et al (2005) show that the level of ambiguity
in choices (uncertain choices made because of missing information) correlates positively with
activation in the OFC. Finally, the greater variability in MR signal in this region may have
diminished our ability to detect these effects as well.
The fundamental question of the current study was how the accumbens and OFC differentially
code predicted reward outcomes relative to unpredicted outcomes (i.e. violations in
expectations). We parametrically manipulated the probability of reward and examined the
neural response to reward and nonreward trials for each probability reward condition. Our data
are consistent with previous human imaging and nonhuman electrophysiological studies
(Fiorillo et al, 2003; Schultz, 2002) and suggest that the accumbens and OFC are sensitive to
reward outcome (reward or not). However, activity in these regions, especially the accumbens,
appears to be modulated by predictions about the likelihood of reward outcomes that are formed
with learning over time. This dynamic pattern of activation might represent modifications in
dopamine activity within or projecting to these regions as information about predicted reward
is learned and updated.
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Figure 1. Task Design
One of three cues (each associated with a distinct probability (33%, 66% and 100%) of
obtaining a fixed amount of reward) appeared on the left or right side of a fixation for 1 s. After
a 2 s delay, a response prompt appeared for 2 s and subjects were instructed to press with pointer
finger if the cue had been on the left and with their middle finger if the cue had been on the
right. After another 2 s delay, either reward feedback (cartoon coins) or an empty treasure chest
were presented in the center of the screen (1000 msec) based on the reward probability of the
trial type. There was a 12 sec intertrial interval (ITI) before the start of the next trial. Total trial
length was 20 s.
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Figure 2. Behavioral results (RT)
a) There was a significant interaction of reward probability and time on task on mean reaction
time. By late trials, subjects were faster when responding to cues associated with the 100%
reward probability condition (mean =498.30, sd=206.23) relative to the 33% condition
(mean=583.74, sd=270.23). The difference in mean reaction time between the 100% and 33%
conditions increased two-fold from early to late trials. b) In a reversal condition at the end of
the experiment, the probabilities of reward for the 33% and 100% conditions and showed a
decrease in RT to the condition that was the 33% probability in the non-reversal (mean=583.74,
sd=270.24) and 100% in the reversal (mean=519.89,sd=180.46).
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Figure 3.
Greater activation to rewarded versus nonrewarded outcomes in the a) nucleus accumbens
(x=9,y=6,z=−1; x=−9, y=9, z=−1) and b) orbital frontal cortex (x=28,y=39, z=−6).
Spicer et al. Page 13
Neuroimage. Author manuscript; available in PMC 2008 January 1.
N
IH
-PA Author M
anuscript
N
IH
-PA Author M
anuscript
N
IH
-PA Author M
anuscript
Figure 4.
Percent MR signal changes as a function of reward outcome and probability in the nucleus
accumbens to a) rewarded and b) nonrewarded outcomes.
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